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Abstract
Two thirds of Kenyan cut flowers are marketed through Dutch flower auctions, while the
remainder is marketed directly to retailers. Auctions do not restrict the volumes marketed;
however price determination is based on a spot market. A Transaction Cost approach is used to
investigate the differences in marketing costs between the channels. The results suggest that
there are no differences between the channels in terms of uncertainty about prices, finding
buyers or transparency of quality standards. Auction growers pay a higher marketing fee but
they have significantly fewer office employees and flower varieties compared to growers who
market directly.
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1.   Introduction and Objective
The Netherlands is a renowned exporter of flowers, with a global market share of 45%. Table 1
shows that the largest producers of cut flowers do not play a significant role in the international
flower trade. African growers export over 95% of their exports to Europe and the Netherlands
has a share of over 75%. The Netherlands acts as a marketing and logistics centre within
Europe, with domestic production and imports largely exported or re-exported to other
markets. Approximately 25% of the turnover of the Dutch flower auctions comes from foreign
suppliers.532  International Flower Networks: Transparency and Risks in Marketing Channel Choice 
Table 1. Top-5 producers, exporters and importers of cut flowers
Source: (AIPH, 2004)
In world shares the Kenyan flower production is modest. During a time span of over 20 years
Kenya has an annual growth rate of 13% in flower production quantity and even 15% in
production value. Kenya is a main foreign supplier to the Netherlands, with two-thirds of
Kenyan production destined for the Netherlands. Despite the fact that roses represent 70% of
Kenyan cut flower production, the industry is relatively diversified compared to other
emerging flower producers. The Kenya Flower Council recognises the European market as of
central importance to the Kenyan flower industry (Dubai, 2004). Kenya’s flower industry is
mature and has achieved a critical mass for technical learning, market information and supply
of equipment, advisory services and logistics. However it largely depends on the Dutch
marketing institutions (Wijnands, 2005)
The main features of the Dutch flower auctions include (Kambil and Heck, 1998):
- All major trading opportunities are found at a large scale in one location.
- Auctions are central hubs providing logistics for efficient transfer of products between
buyers and sellers. Costs are shared among all sellers and buyers.
- The Dutch auctions are the largest marketplaces for flowers worldwide.
- They provide systems for order tracking, payments and settlements within one day.
- The auctions provide for various arbitration mechanisms and rules for resolving problems.
Almost all auctions are co-operatives with Dutch growers as members. Most of the costs of the
auction are equal for member and non-members: e.g. lot charges, trolleys tariffs, costs of
phytosanitary inspection. Members pay a contribution fee between 450 and 1350 euro and
2.9% commission, whereas non-members pay between 3.4 and 5.9% commission
(Commercial leaflet of FloraHolland, 2004). The auction costs are transparent and directly
measurable in monetary values. The trading of flowers on the auction can be based on direct
price formation by the auction clock or on price discovery between buyers and sellers by the
auction. The product will then flow directly from producer to buyer, reducing logistical costs.
Both trading principles are indicated as marketing by auction.
The other marketing channels constitute direct marketing: mostly to supermarkets in the UK.
Costs of direct marketing are less transparent and more difficult to measure in monetary
values. Thoen et al. (1999) list the following transaction cost advantages of an auction
compared to direct marketing:
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1. Cost of direct marketing (e.g. office labour, travel expense, telephone or fax).
2. Payment on a weekly basis by the auctions in contrast to monthly payment.
3. No uncertainty about paying out by the auctions.
4. Transparent quality requirements, inspection and product rejection in auction sales. 
5. Free market information provided by the auctions.
So, Kenyan producers can choose between using the Dutch auction as an intermediary, and
marketing directly to the -mainly British- retailers. Direct marketing and selling to the auction
have different implications for transaction costs related to e.g. information gathering,
uncertainty over prices, or finding buyers, transparency of quality standards, arbitration of
quality disputes, or with payment conditions. 
The research question is: ‘Do Kenyan cut flower growers face different transaction costs for
auctions versus direct marketing channels?’
2.   Theory of Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) describes the firm as an efficiency-inducing administrative
instrument that facilitates exchange between economic actors’ (Lieblein, 2003). According to
Hobbs (1996a) transaction costs are the costs of carrying out any exchange between firms in a
market place or a transfer between stages in a vertically integrated firm. Four key concepts,
which lead to transactions costs, are important:
1. Bounded rationality: People intend to make rational decisions, but in situations of
complexity or uncertainty the ability to make a fully rational decision is limited (Hobbs,
1996a). David and Han (2003) distinguish uncertainty about market conditions, technology
and behavioural aspects. 
2. Opportunism:  Defined by Williamson (1979) as self-interest seeking with guile.
Sometimes businesses or individuals will exploit situations to their own benefits.
According to Hobbs (1996a) the fewer the number of alternative suppliers or buyers, the
more likely that one will act opportunistically to alter the business terms to their own
advantage. A large number of growers, wholesalers and retailers are involved in the flower
industry, which diminish the risk of opportunism.
3. Asset specificity: Refers to the degree to which a transaction needs to be supported by
transaction specific assets. ‘An asset is transaction specific if it cannot be redeployed to an
alternative use without a significant reduction in the value of the asset’ (Douma and
Schreuder, 1992). Asset specificity measures can be classified in 5 categories: human,
physical, product, site and firm specificity (David and Han, 2004). Masten (2000) indicates
that the nature of agricultural products and production means physical and human asset
specificities likely play a less important role in agricultural transactions in comparison to
the temporal and site specificities with production, processing and distributing of
foodstuffs’
4. Informational asymmetry:  In the neoclassical economics perfect competition is possible
because information is perfect and costless. TCE recognizes that many transactions are
characterized by incomplete, imperfect or asymmetrical information.534  International Flower Networks: Transparency and Risks in Marketing Channel Choice 
(Hobbs, 1996b) divides transaction costs in three main categories. Information costs arise in
searching for information about products, prices, inputs or buyers and sellers. Negotiation
costs arise from the physical act of the transaction such as negotiating and writing contracts.
Auction commission costs, transportation costs, speed of payment and time spent on these
activities are also negotiation costs. Monitoring or enforcement costs arise after an exchange
has been negotiated. Quality controls, enforcement of codes of conduct, grade uncertainty (and
hence lower than expected prices) or product damage can be seen as part of monitoring and
enforcement costs. Unfortunately, monetary values cannot be assigned easily to many
transaction costs, because they are often subsumed under managerial costs. The sources of
transaction costs and the distinction between direct costs and opportunity costs is also relevant,
see table 2 (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). The opportunity costs are very likely even more
difficult to quantify in monetary values compared to several direct costs. 
Table 2. Sources and types of transaction costs
Source: (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997)
3.   Research questions
Using the framework in table 2 the vertical coordination of Kenyan cut flower marketing will
be categorized according to the three sources of transaction costs. 
Assets and product specificities are recognized as important by David and Han (2004).
Assets, like land (site specificity), greenhouses, cool store and other equipment (asset
specificity) are not specific: these assets can be used for other crops. Much of the advanced
knowledge of flower growing is already known by the managers, the majority of which non-
Kenyans. These managers can use their human skills in many other parts of the world. Even
investments in rootstock of roses which take up to 40 % of the cost at the farm level can’t be
seen as asset specific. (Thoen et al., 1999). All flowers of each variety meeting the trade
quality standards can always be marketed and thus having a value.
Environmental uncertainty has two dimensions: the adaptation of growers to the market
requirements and the uncertainty over information and negotiation costs. Marketing channel
choice will influence the product selection. Direct marketing demands a larger range of flower
varieties or even bouquets. On the other hand, an auction can easily handle large volumes of
one variety. A large range of varieties increases the opportunity to select a marketing channel.
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A resulting hypothesis is that: direct marketing requires a larger range of varieties on the farm.
In addition, larger farms have more possibilities to grow more varieties. So the number of
varieties is also linked with the farm size. 
Direct coordination costs are involved in communication and negotiation. It will be rather
difficult to separate these costs as is done by Hobbs (1996a). The same individuals are usually
responsible for gathering market intelligence, as well as negotiating prices and volumes. As the
auctions accept each volume of flowers and the price is determined by the clock fewer
marketing personnel are required than in the case of direct marketing. The growers have to pay
the auction fees for these services. A second hypothesis is that: direct marketing requires more
marketing personnel (resources) compared to using the auction channel.
Hobbs (1996a) assumes several types of uncertainty. Growers face uncertainty about the cost
of gathering information on logistics, prices or the quality and quantity at required by buyers
level. In the auction system, the uncertainty lies mainly in the price formation and to a lesser
extent quality classification. Little information is available on the coordination between
growers and direct marketing channels. The research question is: To what extent does
uncertainty with respect to price, payment, volume and quality, finding buyers and risk of non-
sale differ between the marketing channels? 
Behavioral transaction costs deal with monitoring costs, losses and selection of trade
partners, which are closely related to the aforementioned communication and negotiation
activities. These items are therefore also strongly related to the number of marketing
personnel. Losses can be measured by product rejections, choosing another marketing channel
or receiving lower prices. Applying a code of conduct lowers the transaction costs for buyers
and it ensures the application of standards.. Finally one third of the Kenyan farmers are
European. Due to the familiarity with the auction system, it is possible that they would prefer
the auction as marketing channel. The research questions address these issues.
4.   Data and farm characteristics
Data on farm characteristics and transaction costs from Kenyan flower growers were collected
through on-farm interviews in first months of 2005. The research population is based on lists
of flower growers provided by MPS (the Dutch organisation of the Code of Conduct in
Floriculture), KFC (Kenyan Flower Council) and the Dutch flower auction, FloraHolland. A
Kenyan flower industry expert evaluated and corrected this list. This list counts 90 Kenyan
export cut flower farms, from which 45 farmers are selected randomly. A 56% response rate
was achieved, giving a sample of 25 farms. Non-responses were due to inaccurate contact
information (31%), while a further 13% of the original sample declined to participate in the
interview, and 2 farms with missing data for marketing channel are not included in the
analyses. The 25 interviewed farms corresponded to 28 % of all farms (van der Lans, 2005). 
Comparing the final sample population with the total population reveals an under-
representation of small farms, due to incorrect contact information, and some regions with a
small number of farms. The main regions are well represented. Van der Lans (2005) provides
the full questionnaire and sample justification. The farms in the survey cultivate approximately
30 % of the total Kenyan area of cut flowers and have on average 23 hectare cut flowers. On 80536  International Flower Networks: Transparency and Risks in Marketing Channel Choice 
% of the farms only roses are grown and on 12 % a mix of roses and other flowers. The
management is almost equally divided between European, Kenyan and Indian nationality. All
had at least 3 years experience in the industry, while half of the managers had more than 10
years experience. The auction is the main marketing channel, with a share of 70 % compared to
30% for direct marketing. This means that the survey has a slightly higher auction share than
indicated in other sources. Two groups are distinguished for testing the differences between
marketing methods:
1 Auction growers: 11 farms send 100% and 1 farm 95% of their cut flowers to the
auction. The average farms size is 13 ha, with 25 employees per hectare.
2 Mixed channel growers: the other 11 farms have an average size of 33 ha and 26
employees per hectare. These farms market the following shares of their cut flowers
directly:  3 farms carry out 100 % direct marketing; 3 farms between 70 and 85% direct
marketing; 3 farms between 30 and 40% and 2 farms between 15 and 25%.
5.   Empirical findings
Environmental uncertainty and information costs
Price formation depends on the marketing system and differs between the two channels.
Auction prices are always obtained afterwards: the price is available on clock at the moment
the deal is cut between seller and buyer at the auction. The answers of the respondents
consistently confirmed this. The prices in the mixed channel are frequently known in advance.
Most farmers in this channel indicate however that they have no power to influence the prices.
Six out of these 11 farmers, mostly smaller farmers, consider their lack of bargaining power to
be a significant problem. The price uncertainty experienced by the two groups does not differ,
with the majority having no opinion or only perceiving this as a minor problem. Uncertainty
about meeting the quantity and quality requirements, finding buyers and the risk of not making
a sale (non-sale) are also not distinctive between the two market channels. The farmers in the
mixed market channel experience no problems or only minor problems in finding buyers.
Whether the buyers pay satisfactory prices is not stated. Surplus production is generally sold at
lower prices by the auction or to their regular buyers. 
The delay between the time the flowers are sold and when payment is received is also part of
the negotiation cost. The respondents in the auction channel indicated that they receive
payment seven to ten days after the sale. Several growers selling by the auction stated that
quick payment is an important reason for their decision to use the auction channel. They
assume that the delay in payment for direct marketing is much longer, sometimes up to 30
days. However the survey did not reveal significant differences between mixed marketing and
auction growers.
Secondly marketing by auction should result in lower negotiation costs in terms of the time
spent on marketing activities. Table 3 summarizes three types of transaction costs in the field
of marketing. The results indicate that marketing by auctions costs less time. Mixed marketing
sellers spent significantly more time on communication. Over 6 hours is spent weekly onJo H.M. Wijnands et al.   537
administration tasks by 7 out of the 11 of the farms who do not market solely through the
auction. Four of these 11 mention that they spent more than 6 hours on communication. A
large number auction growers has no opinion on this subject.
Table 3. Time spent weekly on marketing flowers by chosen marketing channel (% of farmers)
The first hypothesis is: the range of varieties has to be larger on farms using the mixed
marketing channel, and larger farms will have more varieties. The range of varieties is between
3 and 15 on the ‘auction’ farms and between 3 and 24 on the growers with ‘mixed marketing
channels’. Table 4 summarizes a simple linear regression of this relationship. The hypothesis
‘higher direct sales require a large range of varieties’ is supported at a significance level of 99
% and farm size at 90 %.
Table 4. Estimates of number of varieties and level of direct sales
The second hypothesis is directly linked to transaction costs: the share of office employees
increases with the percentage direct sales. The growers using the auction system have on
average 2.1 % office employees of the total employees on the farm, whereas the growers with
mixed market channels have 4.4 %. As is shown in Table 5 the hypothesis ‘higher direct sales
require a higher share of office employees’ is supported at a significance level of 99 %. Farm
size has no significant influence on the ‘% office employees’ and is not included in the
estimation shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Estimates of share of office employees and level of direct sales
Time spent hour(s) Gathering price information Administration tasks Communication with buyer
Auction Mixed Auction Mixed Auction  Mixed
No opinion 8 10 58 27 92 18
1 hour or less 75 45 17 8 27
1 till 4 hours 8 36 8 9 18
Over 4 hour 8 9 17 64 36
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-value P-value
Dependent: Number of varieties
Independent: Constant 8.0884 1.487 5.438 0.000
% direct sales 0.087 0.028 3.113 0.005
Farm size (ha) 0.064 0.034 1.899 0.072
N=23
R2 =0.421
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-value P-value
Dependent: % offices employees
Independent: Constant 1.981 0.680 2.912 0.008
% direct sales 0.042 0.014 2.916 0.008
N = 23
R2 = 0.288538  International Flower Networks: Transparency and Risks in Marketing Channel Choice 
These higher costs of office employees are partly offset by lower marketing fees. Auction fees
are highly transparent and common knowledge within the industry: 80 % of the respondents
from both marketing channels indicated that auction fees were 7 %. This fee is less than the 10
to 12 % fee mentioned by Thoen et al. (1999) for the Kenyan cut flower sector. Survey
respondents indicated that the fee for direct sales is round 4 %. The auction and direct sales
fees differ significantly from each other. The regression analysis (Table 5) suggest that a full
shift from marketing by auction to direct marketing will increased the number of employees by
4.2 %. Combined with the average labour force on the farm of 25 to 26 employees per hectare
in the survey it means approximately one additional employee per hectare. The confidence
interval is between 1.2 and 7.1 % or between 0.3 and 1.8 additional employees. Insufficient
economic data prevent a full comparative analysis of the relative costs and benefits of the two
marketing channels.
Behavioural transaction costs
Applying a code of conduct (Good Agricultural Practice), increasingly compulsory in the
chain, lowers inspection costs and gives some guarantees on complying with environmental
and sometimes social standards, lowering monitoring costs. Almost 80 % of the growers apply
a code of conduct, primarily following the guidelines of the Kenyan flower council, and
second the Dutch MPS. Two thirds of mixed channels growers apply at least 2 different codes.
More than one third of the auction growers do not apply a code of conduct, which is unrelated
to the farm size. This is quite remarkable: the rejection rate for auction growers is 2.6 % and
for the mixed marketing channel growers is 4.4 %. A significant relation between the variables
‘% rejections’ and ‘% direct marketing’ was not found. Finally, do European managers prefer
auctions? The survey reveals that the nationality of all managers is equally distributed among
the marketing channels; there was no relationship between nationality and preference for
marketing channel. A closer look at the European shows that most Dutch managers prefer
auctions.
6.   Conclusions
Table 6 summarizes the main findings of the differences in transaction costs between auction
and mixed marketing channels. Jo H.M. Wijnands et al.   539
Table 6. Main findings on transaction costs between the action and mixed marketing channel.
In conclusion, it is clear that direct marketing requires more internal marketing resources
within the firm and a larger number of flower varieties. However, farms in the mixed
marketing do not perceive themselves to be at a bargaining power advantage. The governance
type of the global flower chain can be classified as spot market, according to the governance
type of Gereffi et al. (2003). The complexity of transactions is low. Second, the capacity of the
supply base is high, with relatively low rejection rates and production and exports increasing
annually. The transparency in the market channel is rather high and the risks are low. This
research provides insights into the choice of marketing channel choice at the farm level.
Detailed analysis of costs and benefits at a farm level is hampered by data constraints but is a
topic for future research.
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